We conduct a …eld experiment in a Dutch retail chain with 122 stores to study the interaction between team incentives, team social cohesion, and team performance.
Introduction
Teamwork is of vital importance in many professions, generating synergies in production, mutual learning, and social interactions with co-workers. But if co-workers are evaluated or rewarded based on team performance, free-riding may occur (Holmström 1982) . Narrowly self-interested workers slack o¤ as they ignore the bene…ts of their e¤orts that accrue to co-workers, yielding the well-known prediction that free-riding mutes the e¤ect of team incentives on team performance. However, the classic free-rider argument ignores the role of social cohesion among co-workers, which might be a major de…ciency given the high importance attached to it by both organizations and workers. 1 In this paper, we combine …eld experimentation and collection of rich questionnaire data to study two key questions: How social cohesion among co-workers a¤ects the e¤ect of team incentives on team performance and, in turn, how team incentives a¤ect social cohesion. Rotemberg (1994) and Dur and Sol (2010) extend the standard theory of free-riding in teams by including social cohesion, interpreted as co-worker altruism. The more employees care about their co-workers, the more they internalize the bene…ts of their e¤orts that accrue to co-workers. Hence, social cohesion reduces free-riding, implying that the e¤ect of team incentives is larger in more cohesive teams.
We test this theoretical prediction by conducting a …eld experiment in a large retail chain in The Netherlands. We introduce team incentives in a randomly selected subset of stores. To …lter out common shocks, the team incentive is designed as a contest between groups of 4 comparable stores. Within each group, all employees and the manager of the store that achieves the highest sales growth over a period of six weeks earn a monetary bonus. Just before the announcement of the team incentive, we conduct a survey among all employees of all stores, using a tried-and-tested survey scale to measure the social cohesion of employees within each store. This allows us to test whether the response to team incentives increases in the social cohesion of the team. In the analysis, we control for a large set of possibly confounding factors (i.e. store and team characteristics that may also a¤ect the response to team incentives as well as correlate with social cohesion).
Shortly after the six-week incentive period, we conduct the survey again. This allows us to analyze how team incentives a¤ect social cohesion in teams. In theory, this could go either way. Team incentives may induce team members to apply (more) peer pressure, to coerce their co-workers into exerting higher e¤ort (Kandel and Lazear 1992 , Barron and Gjerde 1997) . Even if peer pressure is e¤ective in raising team performance, social cohesion likely su¤ers. Alternatively, team incentives may induce team members to help each other at work (FitzRoy and Kraft 1986, Drago and Turnbull 1988) and to invest (more) in co-worker social relations (Rotemberg 1994, Dur and Sol 2010) . This would raise both performance and social cohesion. To analyze whether these mechanisms are active, we include measures of peer pressure and co-worker helping in our surveys.
The literature on cohesion dates back to Festinger (1950) , who de…nes group cohesion as "the resultant of all the forces acting on members to remain in the group." (Festinger 1950, p. 274) . Subsequent literature distinguishes between task cohesion and social cohesion (Zaccaro and Lowe 1988; Mullen and Copper 1994 ; Casey-Campbell and Martens 2009, Chiocchio and Essiembre 2009). 2 Task cohesion refers to group members'joint commitment to the group's tasks or goals, whereas social cohesion captures interpersonal attraction to the group. This includes friendship relations and the extent to which group members enjoy spending time together. Following Widmeyer et al. (1995) , Carless and De Paola (2000, p.73) de…ne social cohesion as "the motivation to develop and maintain social relationships within the group." To measure cohesion, we use the survey scale developed by Carless and De Paola (2000) , discussed in more detail in Section 2.3. 3 Our key …ndings are as follows. First, the introduction of team incentives increases sales by 1.5 percentage points. This average treatment e¤ect is not statistically signi…cant, although it falls well within the range of …ndings in related studies in similar contexts. As predicted, the e¤ect of the team incentive on sales increases in the team's pre-existing level of social cohesion. This e¤ect is sizeable: a one standard deviation increase in social cohesion increases the estimated e¤ect of the team incentives on sales by 2 percentage points. We …nd a statistically signi…cant e¤ect of team incentives on sales for stores that belong to the top quartile in terms of social cohesion. Hence, we provide strong evidence that better social relations among team members mitigate free-rider e¤ects.
Using the pre-and post-experiment questionnaire data, we …nd a small and statistically insigni…cant positive e¤ect of team incentives on social cohesion. We do …nd limited evidence 2 A limited number of studies also include group pride as a component of group cohesion (Mullen and Copper 1994; Chiocchio and Essiembre 2009 ). 3 What drives di¤erences in social cohesion between work teams? Correlational studies document that groups that are more homogeneous in terms of personal characteristics, such as gender, ethnicity, age, and tenure, tend to be more cohesive (Williams and O'Reilly 1998; McPherson et al. 2001) . Cohesiveness relates to leadership (Nishii and Mayer 2009; Wendt et al. 2009 ), to group size (Carron and Sprink 1995) , and to the type of tasks the team performs (Zaccaro and McCoy 1988) . We control for most of these possible confounds in our empirical analysis. Relatedly, Harrison et al. (2002) and Berger et al. (2011) …nd that team members collaborate and cooperate more in the presence of team-based performance pay. Employees are also more likely to engage in peer pressure, i.e. to take action upon observing a shirking colleague, in …rms that o¤er team incentives (Freeman et al. 2010 ).
for an increase in co-worker helping, and …nd no e¤ects on peer pressure and job satisfaction. Hence, social relations among team members are neither improved nor hurt by the implementation of team incentives.
Our paper contributes to two strands of literature. First, we contribute to a rapidly expanding literature studying the e¤ects of incentive pay in the workplace (for recent reviews see Levitt and Neckermann 2014 and Lazear 2018) . In an early …eld experiment, Erev et al. (1993) documents substantial free-riding under team incentives among orange pickers. Erev et al. (1993) and Bandiera et al. (2013) …nd that a contest between teams leads to higher performance than team incentives based on the team's absolute performance. This is also a common …nding in lab experiments, see Sheremeta (2018) . Lavy (2002) …nds positive e¤ects of team-based pay for teachers on student performance, but subsequent studies have found mixed results (Glewwe et al. 2010; Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2011, Fryer 2013) . Team incentives increased performance at the UK tax authorities, partially through the reallocation of more able employees to incentivized tasks (Burgess et al. 2010 ). Englmaier et al. (2018) …nds positive e¤ects of team incentives on group performance in escape rooms.
Several recent studies analyze the e¤ects of team incentives in retail chains. Using comparable levels of incentive pay, average treatment e¤ects on performance range from 0 to 5 percent (Delfgaauw et al. 2013 (Delfgaauw et al. , 2014 (Delfgaauw et al. , 2015 (Delfgaauw et al. , 2019 Friebel et al. 2017 ). Among others, these papers show that the response to team incentives relates to the gender composition of the team (Delfgaauw et al. 2013 ) and to measures of local demand and to the share of non-eligible employees (Friebel et al. 2017) . None of these studies analyzes the interplay between team incentives, social cohesion, and performance.
Second, we add to the literature on social incentives in the workplace (Ashraf and Bandiera 2018), which studies how social concerns a¤ect workers' performance. A classic study in this area is Hamilton et al. (2003) , which …nds increased output after a switch from individual production and incentives to team production and incentives in a garment factory. Some employees voluntarily joined teams despite a drop in earnings. Bandiera et al. (2005) …nds that switching from relative performance pay to individual performance pay increases performance among fruit pickers. This e¤ect is most pronounced among socially related workers, suggesting that workers (partially) internalize the negative externality they impose on others. 4 Comparing individual and team incentives for gym and library visits, Babcock et al. (2015) …nds higher performance for teams when team members know each other. Our results are in line with the insight that individuals in teams with good social relations internalize external e¤ects on team members. Furthermore, we are one of the …rst to analyze how team incentives a¤ect social relations. The only other study we are aware of that has a similar objective is Carpenter and Seki (2011), studying …shermen in Toyoma Bay. Part of their …ndings are close to ours: …shermen who engage in team production are more productive than those who do not and this can be largely attributed to social preferences. In contrast to our results, they do …nd an e¤ect of team production on team members'altruism. Given that many …rms and employees value social relations at work (see footnote 1 above), it is surprising how little evidence exists on how organizational policies a¤ect social relations among employees.
Given the absence of exogenous variation in social cohesion in our study, we cannot assess whether strengthening social cohesion leads to better team performance. Meta-analyses of the literature in organizational psychology distill a positive relation, but acknowledge mixed results of individual studies (Mullen and Copper 1994 , Gully et al. 1995 , Beal et al. 2003 , Bell 2007 , Chiocchio and Essiembre 2009 ). Chen and Lim (2013) and Lim and Chen (2014) show that allowing participants to interact before performing a task in a lab experiment improves performance under team incentives but not under individual incentives. Corgnet et al. (2019) …nds that under team incentives, but not under individual incentives, participants perform worse if one of their co-workers is a robot rather than a human. This pattern is stronger for altruistic than for non-altruistic individuals, highlighting the interaction between social and material incentives. De Paola et al. (2019) conduct a …eld experiment and …nd that students assigned to teams composed of friends perform better on both individual and team assignments than students assigned to team composed of strangers.
Our study also relates to the literature on group identity and in-group favoritism (Tajfel and Turner 1979, Akerlof and Kranton 2000) . Experimental studies …nd that people behave more altruistically and cooperatively towards members from the same group than to outsiders, even if groups are randomly formed (Goette et al. 2006 , Charness et al. 2007 , Chen and Li 2009 ). In situations of intergroup con ‡ict, group members may even be hostile towards members of other groups (see e.g. Goette et al. 2012 ). We study an actual workplace setting, and show that employees'perception of their group's cohesiveness matters for how they respond to a monetary incentive with both positive in-group externalities and negative out-group externalities.
For managers, our …ndings indicate complementarities between team incentives and social cohesion in production. Hence, investments in social cohesion yield higher returns if team incentives are stronger. Furthermore, the team incentives neither improved nor harmed social cohesion within stores. This may comfort managers who consider introducing team incentives but worry about the e¤ects on social relations within the team. At the same time, our results suggest that team incentives are no panacea for bad co-worker relations.
Methodologically, our paper illustrates the potential of a research design that combines …eld experimentation and rich questionnaire data collection at multiple points in time. It allows to estimate heterogeneous treatment e¤ects of policies with respect to individual or team characteristics that are best measured using questionnaires, and to estimate the e¤ects of speci…c policies and practices on those characteristics. This holds promise for deepening our understanding of the mechanisms that drive the e¤ects of management practices on organizational performance, and complements the approach of measuring and improving the general quality of …rms'management practices (Bloom and van Reenen 2007; Bloom et al. 2013) .
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents our experimental setting and design, Section 3 describes our data and Section 4 contains our methodology. We present the main results in Section 5 and discuss several robustness checks in Section 6. Section 7 concludes with a discussion.
The Experiment

The …rm
We conduct the …eld experiment in a retail chain consisting of 122 stores during the Fall of 2013. 5 All stores of the retail chain are located in The Netherlands and operate under a single brand name. The stores sell clothes, shoes, and items for sports and outdoor activities. The chain mostly targets budget-minded consumers. In the company, many decisions are taken by the central management at the headquarters. The product range, pricing, general personnel policies, the internal store design, branding, and advertisement are uniform across stores. Store managers are responsible for day-to-day organization and for the sta¢ ng of their store. Within a store, products are placed on displays. Customers can take these items to the registry. Alternatively, customers can ask an employee for help, for instance to measure their shoe size or to see whether a particular item is available.
Stores vary in size, and employ a manager and between 5 and 17 employees. 6 As many employees work part-time or on-call, on a typical weekday only a subset of employees are present in the store. Employees earn a ‡at wage just above the legal minimum wage. Store managers earn about 40% more, and a small fraction of their pay is performance-related. Employees'tasks include manning the registry, keeping the displays stocked and tidy, advis- 5 The results of two earlier experiments within the same retail chain are reported in Delfgaauw et al. (2011 Delfgaauw et al. ( , 2013 . These …eld experiments took place between 2007 and 2009. 6 During our experiment, two stores did not have a store manager.
ing customers, and cleaning the store. In this environment, employees'actions and e¤orts will not have enormous e¤ects on sales. As mentioned in the Introduction, earlier experiments in similar settings …nd that incentive pay for employees tend to increase sales by about 0 to 5 percentage points. The chain's central management is con…dent that employees can a¤ect sales, for instance by keeping displays stocked, providing good service and advice to customers, and by suggesting alternative or complementary products. For this reason, they occasionally organize short-term incentive events.
Experimental design
The experimental treatment is the introduction of a monetary team incentive for the employees of 72 randomly chosen stores. The remaining 50 stores make up our control group. We decided to make the treatment group larger than the control group to increase power, anticipating that the variance of performance during the treatment period would be larger among stores in the treatment group than among stores in the control group (List et al. 2011) . To achieve balance of the key variables for our analysis, we strati…ed on both stores' social cohesion (as measured in the pre-experiment survey) and stores'past sales peformance. We explain the randomization procedure in subsection 2.4 below. The 72 stores assigned to the treatment group are subdivided into groups of 4 stores. Within each group, all employees and the manager of the store that achieves the highest sales growth over a period of six weeks receive a monetary bonus. Sales growth is measured as the percentage change in sales compared to the same weeks a year earlier. This is a common performance measure in this retail chain. Employees are generally well-aware of their store's performance in terms of sales growth. The bonus was set at 75 euro for full-time employees, 50 euro for part-time employees, and 25 euro for on-call employees. 7 For full-time employees, the bonus is about 4% of their monthly earnings, corresponding to about 2.8% of earnings over a six-week period. For store managers, the bonus is about 2.9% of monthly earnings. These amounts are comparable to bonus pay in earlier experiments in retail chains (see the Discussion section in Delfgaauw et al. 2019 ). The treatment period was week 42 to 47 in 2013 (October 14th to November 24th). During this period, no other events or policy changes took place. Hence, for stores in the control group, it was business-as-usual.
We deliberately designed the team incentive as a contest between stores. Stores'sales are highly volatile, largely due to chain-wide factors such as holidays, weather, and advertisement campaigns. Figure 1 shows the weekly average of all stores'sales growth for the period of week 1 to week 47 in 2013. 8 Week-…xed e¤ects alone explain 58.4% of the total variation in stores' sales growth over this period, underlining the importance of common shocks to performance. The large volatility in sales makes it undesirable to use absolute sales targets. A positive (negative) shock can make a pre-determined target too easy (di¢ cult) to reach, reducing the incentive e¤ect. As a large part of volatility is due to common shocks in our context, relative performance pay is more suitable for providing incentives because its incentive e¤ect is immune to common shocks (Lazear and Rosen 1981 , Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz 1982 , Green and Stokey 1983 . The e¤ects of tournament incentives are predicted to be stronger if contestants are more homogenous in ability (Lazear and Rosen 1981) . Therefore, we grouped stores on the basis of historical performance, as follows. We ranked the stores on the basis of sales growth in the six months preceding the treatment period (week 15 to 40, 2013). The top four stores comprised one tournament group, as well as stores ranked 5th to 8th, and so on. To limit the scope for collusion or sabotage, we adjusted the group composition if stores from the same region were grouped together. 9 All communication on the experiment to employees ran through the company's regular communication channels. Two weeks before the start of the contests, a general announcement was sent digitally to all employees. The message stated that an incentive event would take place in a few weeks, that a subset of stores would participate in this event, and that more information would follow soon. Three days before the start, all store managers received 8 We do not have access to sales growth data after the experimental period. 9 We made 7 such adjustments. The letter for managers of stores in the control group stated that their store would not participate this time, but would participate in a later event. 10 The letter for managers of stores in the treatment group stated that their store would participate in the current contest, and explained the rules and the reward. Furthermore, on the …rst day of the contest, all participating stores received a large, brightly-colored poster designed for this event. The poster stated the period of the sales contest, listed all four stores in the group (in alphabetical order), and mentioned that the group composed of stores with similar sales growth in the past period. During the contest, all participating stores received weekly feedback, in the form of a large poster containing a ranking of the stores and their sales growth in the contest so far. These posters also reminded employees of the reward for winning. See Figure 2 for an example of these posters. Store managers were instructed to hang the posters on a prominent place in the store's canteen.
Stores in the control group did not receive any posters. This implies that our intervention comprises the team incentive and the weekly posters. 11 As sales growth is a well-known performance measure in the retail chain, we have little reason to believe that any treatment e¤ects are also driven by better access to information on performance.
Survey design
A key variable for our analysis is the social cohesion of employees within a store. We are interested in how pre-existing social cohesion a¤ects the response to team incentives, as well as whether and how social cohesion is a¤ected by the introduction of team incentives. This requires measuring social cohesion, both before and after the experiment. Furthermore, we are interested in whether the e¤ect of team incentives on social cohesion relates to e¤ects on co-worker helping and/or on peer pressure. For this reason, we administer a pre-experiment and a post-experiment survey among employees and store managers. For all survey measures, we used tried-and-tested survey scales, as discussed below. The complete survey can be found in the Appendix.
Several survey measures for teams'social cohesion exist in the literature on group cohesion following Festinger (1950) . We use the survey questions developed by Carless and De Paola (2000) . They adapted the group cohesion scale by Widmeyer et al. (1985) from a sports setting to a work setting. 12 Table 1 lists the six survey items that together form the measure of social cohesion (our full survey can be found in the Appendix). Each item is a statement to which employees can respond on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from "completely disagree" to "completely agree". The questions capture whether work group members like to interact outside of work and whether this team is an important social group for the respondent. We take the average of the responses to the six questions as an individual's perception of his or her team's social cohesion. 13 Social cohesion has been shown to correlate strongly with task cohesion and leadership style (Mullen and Copper 1994, Carless and De Paola 2000, Wendt et al. 2009, Chiocchio and Essiembre 2009). We included measures of task cohesion and leadership style in our survey so as to be able to control for treatment e¤ect heterogeneity with respect to these variables in our analysis. Task cohesion captures the degree of alignment among team members regarding the team's goals and approach, and is generally measured alongside social cohesion in determining group cohesion. We implement the survey scale developed by Carless and De Paola (2000) , which contains 4 items. Wendt et al. (2009) show that directive (supportive) leadership is negatively (positively) correlated with group cohesion. Directive leadership captures a management style of control, close supervision, and authority. Sup- 12 Price and Mueller (1986) o¤er an alternative social cohesion scale. See Casey-Campbell and Martens (2009) for a discussion on measurement of group cohesion. 13 We reverse the responses of the negatively-phrased questions, so that a higher response corresponds to higher social cohesion. The same holds for the other survey measures. Please indicate for each proposition which answer corresponds best to your situation in the past two months. The following questions revolve around the atmosphere in your store.
-Our team would like to spend time together outside of work hours.
-Members of our team do not stick together outside of work hours.
-Our team members rarely do something nice together.
-Members of our team would rather go out on their own than get together as a team.
-For me this team is one of the most important social groups to which I belong.
-Some of my best friends are in this team.
The propositions came with answers on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 'Completely agree' to 'Compeletely disagree'.
portive leadership revolves around building relationships, encouragement, and concern for employees. To reduce the length of the survey, we use 6 out of the 14 questions in the survey scale used by Wendt et al. (2009), 3 for both leadership styles.
In the literature on group cohesion, there is discussion whether cohesion is an individuallevel or a group-level construct (Dion 2000 , Friedkin 2004 ). As our main intervention is a team incentive and, hence, administered at the team level, we choose to create measures of social cohesion, task cohesion, and leadership style at the team-level as well. Thereto, we take the mean of the individuals'average score on a given survey measure over all respondents from a given store. We use these store-level measures to determine how the e¤ect of team incentives depends on social cohesion in the store. In the analysis of the e¤ect of team incentives on social cohesion, we estimate the e¤ect both using individual-level data and using store-level data.
For peer pressure, we use the survey questions developed by Freeman et al. (2008 Freeman et al. ( , 2010 . Their 'anti-shirking index' measures the willingness to undertake action upon observing a shirking colleague, where employees could indicate the likelihood that they would (a) do nothing, (b) talk to the shirking colleague, (c) talk to other colleagues, and (d) talk to the supervisor. 14 Using cross-sectional data from the General Social Survey in the US, Freeman et al. (2010) …nds that a majority of workers state that they would take action upon observing a shirking colleague. Furthermore, they …nd that anti-shirking behavior is positively related to the presence of team incentives.
For co-worker helping, we use 2 out of 5 questions from the scale for interpersonal helping developed Moorman and Blakely (1995) , who used this scale as one dimension in their measurement of organizational citizenship behavior. The questions capture the extent of team members'willingness to help each other at work. Lastly, we include three questions that measure individuals'job satisfaction, job search, and intention to quit. For job satisfaction, we use a general question as in Clark (2001) . For job search and intention to quit, we follow the recommendation by Tett and Meyer (1993) to use single-item measures and to refer to a speci…c time period. The question for job search is retrospective: "Did you search for another job in the past two months?" Here, we chose the two-month period as this corresponds to the period between the two surveys (in which the experiment took place). The question for intentions to quit is forward-looking instead. Survey questions on job search and intention to quit have been shown to predict actual quits (Böckerman and Ilmakunnas 2009 , Cornelissen 2009 , Card et al. 2012 ).
Employees and store managers receive almost identical surveys. There are two di¤erences. First, in the measure for peer pressure, the survey for store managers does not contain the question on whether the respondent reports a shirking colleague to the store manager. Second, in the questions on leadership, 'The store manager' is replaced with 'I'. In the main analysis, we make no distinctions between managers and employees in determining team's social cohesion and other store-level survey outcomes. As a robustness check, we also construct store-level measures excluding the manager.
We send e-mail invitations to take part in the pre-and post-experiment online questionnaires to all employees and store managers. This e-mail stated that the company collaborated with the University of Amsterdam to investigate the satisfaction of all employees in the stores. It also stated that the survey would take less than 5 minutes to complete, and that responses would not be shared with the company, neither at the individual nor at the store level. We o¤ered an incentive to complete both surveys: we allotted a tablet (retail price 200 euro) to an individual randomly drawn from the set of people who completed both surveys. For each survey, employees were given 10 days to complete it. We sent two reminders to non-respondents. For 16 percent of the employees, we did not have an email-address. These employees received the invitations through regular mail. The invitation letters were identical to the e-mails, apart from a personalized password to access the questionnaire online. We did not send reminders through regular mail. 15 
The assignment procedure
In designing our randomization procedure, we aimed to make the treatment group and the control group similar in their distributions of sales performance and social cohesion. Thereto, we strati…ed on social cohesion as measured in the pre-experiment survey and on past performance, as follows. First, we ranked all stores on their social cohesion. 16 We created 12 blocks of stores with similar social cohesion, i.e. 10 blocks with 10 stores and 2 blocks with 11 stores. Next, we ranked all stores within each block on the basis of average sales growth over the preceding six months (weeks 15 -40, 2013) . We split each block into two equally large strata, where one stratum contained the stores with relatively high sales growth and the other stratum the stores with relatively low sales growth. Finally, we randomly assigned three stores from each of the 24 strata to the treatment group, yielding 72 treatment stores. The remaining 50 stores make up our control group. Figure 3 presents a schematic overview of the design and the timing of events.
Descriptive Statistics
Our analysis draws on three sources of data. First, we use weekly data on sales for each store for the period of week 1 to week 47 in 2013. For reasons of con…dentiality, we do not have access to absolute sales …gures. Instead, we use indexed sales data for the period of week 1 in 2012 to week 47 in 2013. Week 1 in 2010 is the base week for each store. For our analysis, this allows us to compute a store's sales growth compared to the same week a year earlier. 17 Note that this performance measure is also used in the sales competition. Second, we use the companies'personnel data as of September 2013, containing demographic and contractual information for all employees. This includes employees'gender, age, tenure, and job level. Third, we use the data obtained from the pre-and post-experiment surveys conducted among the employees.
Store and personnel characteristics
The …rst column in Table 2 reports descriptive statistics regarding store performance and personnel characteristics. Average sales growth before the experimental period is close to zero, but di¤ers substantially across stores. During the experimental period, average sales growth is negative, which is not extraordinary as can be seen in Figure 1 . Like many other retail chains, ours su¤ered from the aftermath of the economic crisis as well as from increased competition from online shops. Within-store standard deviation of sales growth across weeks is high, echoing the volatility of sales growth depicted in Figure 1 . On average, stores have about 10 employees, and more than …ve out of six employees are female. Employees are relatively young and have on average 6 years of tenure. About 40 percent of employees works on-call. The average manager is older and has a longer tenure than the average employee. Almost 60 percent of store managers is male. Columns 2 and 3 in Table 2 show that stores in the treatment group and stores in the control group are similar in terms of sales growth before the experiment as well as on all store characteristics. Average sales growth before the experiment is slightly, but not signi…cantly, higher in the treatment group than in the control group. This di¤erence increases somewhat during the experimental period, heralding the average treatment e¤ect we report in our analysis below. Table 3 give the results of the pre-and post-experiment survey, respectively. Column 1 shows that on average, 35 percent of the employees in a store completed 17 Let R s;w;y be sales of store s in week w of year y, and R s;b the sales of store s in the base week. We 18 We discuss self-selection into the surveys below.
Survey data
Descriptives
Panel A and panel B of
The average response to the survey questions on social cohesion in the pre-experiment survey is 3.8 on a 7-point scale. Figure 4 gives the distribution of stores' social cohesion, showing considerable variation. Hence, in some stores, the team is very close and engages in social activities outside of work hours, whereas in other stores, people do not regard their colleagues as an important social group.
The other survey measures in the …rst column in Panel A of Table 3 show that task cohesion is stronger than social cohesion, that leadership is perceived as more supportive than directive, that employees experience substantial co-worker helping, and that employees impose a moderate level of peer pressure. Columns 2 and 3 in Panel A show that response rates and all survey measures are very similar across the treatment group and the control group. Hence, our assignment procedure has created two groups of stores that are, on average, similar in historical performance, personnel characteristics, and all survey measures. Panel B of Table 3 shows that in the post-experiment survey, the outcomes are quite close to the pre-experiment outcomes. 19 Table 4 provides correlations between store performance, personnel characteristics, and 18 Table 3 gives the average of outcomes at the store level. The overall response rate of employees to the pre-and post-experiment surveys is also 35 percent and 23 percent, respectively. 19 In the data, job satisfaction, job search and intention to quit are strongly correlated. For brevity, we have chosen to only report job satisfaction. the survey measures (averaged at the store level). Average sales growth before the experiment is neither correlated with social cohesion nor with task cohesion, but is positively (negatively) correlated with supportive (directive) leadership. 20 None of the personnel characteristics correlates strongly with store's sales growth. In line with the earlier literature, social cohesion correlates positively with both task cohesion and supportive leadership and negatively with directive leadership. As was to be expected, co-worker helping correlates positively with social cohesion, whereas peer pressure correlates negatively. Personnel characteristics do not correlate with social cohesion, except for a negative correlation with the dispersion in age among employees. More generally, store characteristics do not correlate strongly with the survey measures. In line with earlier studies (Williams and O'Reilly 1998; McPherson et al. 2001 ), we do …nd negative correlations between task cohesion and the dispersion in tenure and age among employees as well as between co-worker helping and the dispersion in tenure and age.
Validity of survey measures
Our survey measures have been tried-and-tested in earlier literature. Here, we report three internal validity statistics. First, we determine Cronbach's Alpha for all measures that consist of more than one question. Second, we report intra-class correlation coe¢ cients, which provide an indication of the strength of within-store correlations in the survey measures. Third, we look at the consistency of survey measures over time, by looking at the correlation of measures between the pre-experiment and the post-experiment survey.
Column 1 of Table 5 gives the Cronbach's Alpha for all survey measures at the individual level, for both surveys separately. For social cohesion, the Cronbach's Alphas are comparable to those found in Carless and De Paola (2000) and indicate a su¢ cient degree of internal consistency in the scale. The same holds for the other measures, with the exception of directive leadership, which has a low Cronbach's Alpha. All Cronbach's Alpha's are slightly higher if we exclude the responses from the managers from calculating these measures.
Column 2 in Table 5 gives the intra-class correlation coe¢ cients, a measure of the withinstore correlation of survey outcomes across employees. The intra-class correlation of social cohesion is around 0.2. This is a moderate amount of within-store correlation. 21 Hence, within a team, employees'perception of the social cohesion in the team contains a common element, but also contains idiosyncratic elements. One possibility is that subsets of employees within stores do have good social relations with each-other, but that others are left out. For this reason, we include a robustness check in our analysis below. We create a measure of the dispersion of social cohesion across employees within a store, and analyze whether our results are a¤ected if we control for this dispersion. For most other survey measures, the intra-class correlation is rather small as well. Hence, people within a store do vary in their perception of task cohesion, leadership, co-worker helping, and peer pressure.
Lastly, we assess the stability of the di¤erent survey measures over time by comparing the pre-and post-experiment survey outcomes. As the post-experiment measures in the treatment group may have been a¤ected by the team incentive, we do so for stores in the control group only. Column 3 in Table 5 reports the correlations between the pre-experiment and the post-experiment survey measures at the individual employee level, while column 4 reports these correlations at the store level. As expected, the correlations at the individual level are generally higher than at the store level. For social cohesion, the correlation is 0.74 at the individual level and 0.61 at the store level, respectively. For the other survey measures, we also …nd high correlations, with the exception of directive leadership. This suggests that the survey measures do capture latent factors that are relatively stable over time.
Overall, our survey measures have reasonably good internal validity statistics, with the exception of directive leadership. None of our result are qualitatively a¤ected if we drop directive leadership from our analysis.
Self-selection into the surveys
Given our design, employees'self-selection into the pre-and post-experiment surveys raises several possible concerns. If respondents are systematically di¤erent from non-respondents, our survey measures could be biased. This would be particularly problematic if self-selection into the surveys di¤ers between employees from stores in the treatment group and employees from stores in the control group. Importantly, the decision to respond to the pre-experiment survey cannot be based on the assignment to treatment or control, as this survey was conducted before the stores' assignment. If assignment to treatment or control would a¤ect employees' decision to respond to the post-experiment survey, our estimates of the e¤ect of team incentives on the survey measures could be driven by di¤erential self-selection of respondents rather than real changes within the stores. Fortunately, we …nd no indications of such di¤erences in self-selection, as discussed below.
Column 1 of Table 6 shows that among managers, respondents are older, have longer tenure, and are more likely to be male than non-respondents. 22 This holds for both surveys. Among employees, there are no signi…cant di¤erences in personnel characteristics between respondents and non-respondents in either survey. Columns 2 and 3 show that these …ndings also hold for the subsets of control stores and treatment stores. We …nd no signi…cant di¤erences between treatment and control in the di¤erences in personnel characteristics between respondents and non-respondents. Response rates to both surveys are also similar for treatment and control.
Next, we compare the survey outcomes of the people that answered both surveys with the outcomes of the people that answered either only to the pre-experiment survey or only to the post-experiment survey. 23 Conditional on answering the pre-experiment survey, the probability of responding to the post-experiment survey is 62% in the treatment group and 57% in the control group. Similarly, conditional on responding to the post-experiment survey, the probability of having answered the pre-experiment survey is 87% in the treatment group and 88% in the control group. Neither of these di¤erences between the treatment and the control group is statistically signi…cant. Figure 5 shows the distributions of the survey measures in the pre-experiment survey, separately for people who did and did not answer the post-experiment survey. Similarly, Figure 6 gives the distributions of these survey measures in the post-experiment survey, for respondents who did and did not respond to the pre-experiment survey. Using Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, we …nd no signi…cant di¤erences between the two groups for any measure in either survey. 24 Hence, self-selection into the 23 In total, 285 employees completed both surveys, 189 completed the pre-experiment survey only, and 41 completed only the post-experiment survey. 24 Performing these tests separately for respondents from stores in the treatment group and respondents We cannot fully rule out a bias due to self-selection, as it may be driven by unobservables. For instance, if the decision to respond to the post-experiment survey depends on the change in a store's social cohesion during the experimental period, it is impossible to assess whether this di¤ers between stores in the treatment group and stores in the control group. However, the …ndings discussed above show that on all observable dimensions, self-selection into the surveys appears unrelated to assignment to treatment or control.
Hypotheses and methodology
We use our experiment to test three hypotheses. First, we test whether the introduction of team incentives results in higher performance. This prediction follows from standard economic theory: the prospect of earning a bonus spurs additional e¤ort from employees. We estimate the e¤ect of the introduction of the team incentives on sales growth using panel OLS regressions with store-and week-…xed e¤ects. Let R s;w denote the sales growth of store s in week w. The average treatment e¤ect is estimated by:
from stores in the control group does not yield any statistically signi…cant di¤erence either.
where s and w are store-and week-…xed e¤ects, respectively. T s;w is a dummy that takes value 1 for stores in the treatment group during the experimental period, so that captures the average treatment e¤ect. " s;w is the error term. In all estimations, we cluster standard errors at the store level, to adjust for (serial) correlation within stores (Bertrand et al. 2004 ). Second, we test whether the response to team incentives is stronger in teams with more social cohesion. In theory, employees'response to team incentives is muted by the free-rider e¤ect. The cost of e¤ort is borne by the individual employee, but the bene…ts of e¤ort are spread out across all team members. If employees are narrowly self-interested, their response to team incentives is sub-optimally low. However, if employees care about each other, the free-rider e¤ect is mitigated as employees internalize (part of) the bene…ts of their e¤ort that accrue to their team members (Rotemberg 1994; Dur and Sol 2010) . Hence, we predict that social cohesion among employees in a store positively a¤ects the store's response to team incentives.
Let C q s , with q 2 [1; 2], denote the social cohesion of store s as measured in the preexperiment questionnaire if q = 1 and in the post-experiment questionnaire if q = 2. We estimate the relation between store's social cohesion and the e¤ect of team incentives on performance by interacting treatment dummy T s;w with stores'social cohesion as measured in the pre-experiment questionnaire C 1 s :
Here, E s;w is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for all stores during the experimental period. Hence, through E s;w C 1 s , we control for changes in the relation between social cohesion and sales growth that are unrelated to the experiment. Our main prediction is that > 0: in stores with stronger social cohesion, performance increases more strongly in response to the introduction of team incentives as compared to stores where social cohesion is weaker. We will also perform a regression that allows for a nonlinear relation between social cohesion and the e¤ect of team incentives on performance.
Stores' social cohesion C 1 s is taken from the pre-experiment survey and, therefore, is not a¤ected by our experimental introduction of team incentives. To deal with possible confounds, we control for the interactions between other store-level measures from the preexperiment survey and the T s;w and E s;w dummies, to exclude that these drive the estimated relation between social cohesion and the response to treatment. Similarly, we control for interactions with store characteristics that may a¤ect the response to team incentives, such as the number of employees in the team, the gender composition, and employees'tenure. 25 Our third test concerns the e¤ect of team incentives on social cohesion. Here, the existing literature provides competing hypotheses. Rotemberg (1994) and Dur and Sol (2010) argue that team incentives induce employees to invest in interpersonal relations. Better relations imply less free-riding. Hence, team incentives make it more rewarding to invest in co-worker relations, for instance by helping co-workers as in Fitzroy and Kraft (1986) and Drago and Turnbull (1988) . Kandel and Lazear (1992) and Barron and Gjerde (1997) , on the contrary, argue that stronger team incentives can lead to more peer pressure. As more is at stake, employees may coerce their colleagues to put in extra time and e¤ort. This may lead to better performance, but also harm social relations among co-workers. Our design allows to determine which of these hypotheses best predicts the e¤ect of team incentives on social cohesion in our context. To establish whether the mechanisms put forward in the literature drive the e¤ect, we estimate the e¤ects of team incentives on peer pressure, co-worker helping, and job satisfaction.
We choose to estimate the e¤ects of team incentives on social cohesion, co-worker helping, peer pressure, and job satisfaction at the employee-level. 26 Let C q s;i denote the social cohesion of employee i employed in store s as measured in questionnaire q. We estimate
where i and q are individual and questionnaire-…xed e¤ects, respectively. T s;q is the treatment dummy, which takes value 1 for individuals employed in the treatment stores for the post-experiment questionnaire (q = 2). Hence, gives the average treatment e¤ect of team incentives on social cohesion. " i;q is an error term. Note that we again cluster errors at the store level. In the same way, we estimate the average treatment e¤ect on the other survey measures.
Results
How does social cohesion a¤ect the e¤ect of team incentives on performance?
Column 1 in Table 7 presents the results of estimating the average treatment e¤ect using regression equation (1) . The average treatment e¤ect of the team incentive is 1.5 percentage points higher sales growth. This e¤ect is not statistically signi…cant, but is well within the range of …ndings in comparable settings (see the Discussion section in Delfgaauw et al. 2019 ). 27 In the absence of data on absolute sales revenue and margins, we cannot perform an exact cost-bene…t analysis, but we can do an approximation. In the experiment, the employees of 18 stores won a bonus of, on average, 50 euro. As an average store has 10 employees, the total amount of bonus pay is about 9,000 euro. Furthermore, the company spend about 700 euro on communication (sending letters and posters), implying a total cost of approximately 10,000 euro. Using …gures from Statistics Netherlands, the average shoe shop in The Netherlands earns about 600,000 euro per year, with a gross margin of about 45 percent. As the retail chain where we conducted our study targets budget-minded consumers, we use conservative estimates to approximate the e¤ect of our intervention on revenue. Our experiment ran for 6 weeks in 72 stores. Using yearly revenue of 500,00 euro per store and a gross margin of 30 percent, this implies that an increase in sales during the experiment of about 0.8 percentage point would su¢ ce for breaking even. The estimates in column 1 of Table 7 imply that the point estimate of the e¤ect on pro…ts is about 8,700 euro, and the probability that the experiment increased pro…t equals 72 percent.
Column 2 in Table 7 gives the results of estimating (2) . In line with the theoretical prediction, we …nd that the e¤ect of the team incentive on sales growth increases in stores' social cohesion. Our estimation of in equation (2) equals 2.891. This implies a sizable relation between social cohesion and the response to team incentives: An increase in social cohesion by one standard deviation (0.79 on a 7-point scale) corresponds to an increase in the predicted e¤ect of team incentives on sales by 2.3 percentage points.
In Figure 7 , we plot the estimated treatment e¤ect as a function of social cohesion, assuming a linear-quadratic relation between social cohesion and the response to team incentives. Here, we …nd that the team incentive hardly a¤ects sales in stores with low to moderate social cohesion. If social cohesion is su¢ ciently high, the team incentive positively a¤ects sales growth. The estimated e¤ect of team incentives on sales growth is statistically signi…cant for about 25% of the stores.
Column 3 of Table 7 adds interaction e¤ects for task cohesion and leadership. The estimated interaction e¤ect of team incentives and social cohesion is hardly a¤ected. Furthermore, task cohesion and employee-manager relations do not interact with the response to team incentives. Hence, even though social cohesion, task cohesion, and leadership styles are correlated, only social cohesion is related to stores'response to team incentives.
In column 4, we also control for other store characteristics that may a¤ect the response Figure 7 : Estimated treatment e¤ect as a function of social cohesion to team incentives: The number of employees and the dispersion in age, tenure, and gender among employees, where dispersion is measured by the standard deviation within the store. Again, we …nd that the estimated interaction e¤ect between social cohesion and team incentives is not a¤ected, although the standard errors are slightly higher. None of the store characteristics relates signi…cantly to the response to team incentives. As a …nal robustness check, we regressed social cohesion on task cohesion, leadership styles, and all store characteristics in our data, see Table A1 in the Appendix. Next, we interacted the residuals of this regression with the treatment dummy. The store-level variables explain about 29 percent of the variation in social cohesion across stores. We …nd that the interaction e¤ect of the residuals of the social cohesion regression and the treatment has the same magnitude as the estimations reported in Table 7 : a coe¢ cient of 3.17 with a standard error of 1.91. Hence, we conclude that the positive relation between social cohesion and the e¤ect of team incentives on performance as reported in column 2 of Table 5 is not driven by observable factors.
How do team incentives a¤ect social cohesion?
Panel A in Table 8 gives the results of estimating (3). We …nd a small and statistically insigni…cant e¤ect of team incentives on social cohesion. The point estimate of 0.04 on a 7-point scale corresponds to an increase of 3.7 percent of a standard deviation in social cohesion. Given the small standard error of the estimate, we can rule out that the team incentive had a sizable e¤ect on social cohesion. Hence, the introduction of team incentives neither hurt nor improved social relations among employees.
We estimate a negative and statistically insigni…cant e¤ect of team incentives on peer pressure. We do …nd a statistically signi…cant positive e¤ect on co-worker helping, but the estimated e¤ect size is still quite small: 0.23 on a 7 point scale, corresponding to 21 percent of a standard deviation in co-worker helping. The estimated e¤ect on job satisfaction is essentially zero. 28 We …nd similar results if we exclude the store managers from these estimations. Furthermore, if we perform the estimations at the store level, the e¤ect on co-worker helping is smaller and statistically insigni…cant. All other …ndings are qualitatively similar. 29 Panel B in Table 8 shows that there is no statistically signi…cant treatment heterogeneity with respect to pre-existing social cohesion. Hence, the small average treatment e¤ects reported in Panel A do not mask di¤erences in response to team incentives between teams that are more and less socially cohesive. 30 Again, using store-level measures rather than individual-level measures does not a¤ect these …ndings qualitatively.
Overall, the e¤ects of the team incentives on social interactions and on job satisfaction within the stores are limited, if any. Hence, the team incentives neither improved nor harmed the atmosphere within stores. This may comfort managers who consider introducing team incentives but worry about the e¤ects on social interactions within the team. At the same time, our results suggest that team incentives are no panacea for bad co-worker relations.
Robustness checks
In this section, we discuss a number of robustness checks. First, we perform a placebo treatment, where we pretend that the treatment took place in the six weeks before we implemented the actual experiment (weeks 36 -41 instead of 42 -47). Columns 1 and 2 in Table 9 report the estimated e¤ects of the placebo treatment. Both the average placebo treatment e¤ect and the interaction between the placebo treatment and social cohesion are considerably smaller than the corresponding estimates of the actual treatment ( Table 7 , columns 1 and 2) and not statistically signi…cant. Note that the coe¢ cient on "Exp. period 28 This also holds for the e¤ects on job search and intention to quit. For exploratory reasons, we also estimated the treatment e¤ect on task cohesion and leadership styles. Again, the estimated e¤ects are small and not statistically signi…cant. 29 Non-reported estimations show that these average treatment e¤ects do not hide substantial di¤erences between stores that did and did not win their competition. 30 Mean-reversion is the most likely explanation for the negative relation between measured social cohesion in the pre-and the post-experiment questionnaires. X Social Cohesion" has the same magnitude as in the main estimations. Hence, the negative relation between social cohesion and sales growth during the experimental period is part of a pre-existing trend, ruling out that contamination drives this relation.
Second, as an alternative for clustering standard errors at the store level to correct for serial correlation, we perform a before -after di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation (Bertrand et al. 2004 ). Hence, we collapse all observations per store into two observations: average sales growth before the experimental period and average sales growth during the experimental period. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 9 show that the results of this di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation are very close to the results of our main speci…cation as reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 . The standard error on the interaction e¤ect between the treatment dummy and store's pre-experiment social cohesion increases just enough to make the e¤ect statistically insigni…cant at the 10% level.
Third, it is possible that the intermediate standings during the competition a¤ected stores'response. We do not attempt to estimate these dynamic e¤ects. 31 If stores respond to the rankings provided during the experiment, the error terms of stores within a competition group may be correlated. To correct for this, we have repeated our estimations of (1) and (2) while clustering standard errors at the competition group level for treatment stores. For control stores, clustering remains at the store level, implying a total of 68 clusters. This does not meaningfully a¤ect the standard errors in our estimations, as reported in columns 5 and 6 in Table 9 .
Fourth, we create a measure of stores'social cohesion that exclude the responses of the store managers. Arguably, their management role could give them a distinct position within the team of employees or may give them a di¤erent view on the team's social interactions. However, we …nd little evidence that supports this. The correlation between the average level of social cohesion as reported by a store's employees (excluding the manager) and the level of social cohesion as reported by the manager is 0.33. Replacing our measure of social cohesion with the measure that excludes the responses by managers hardly a¤ects the estimated interaction e¤ect between the introduction of team incentives and stores' social cohesion, as shown in column 7 of Table 9 .
Lastly, as discussed in Section 3.2, there is variation in reported social cohesion within stores. This may imply that people within a store also react di¤erentially to team incentives. Lacking individual measures of performance, we cannot directly assess this. Instead, we analyze whether controlling for the interaction with the within-store dispersion in reported social cohesion a¤ects our …ndings. Thereto, we use the within-store standard deviation of social cohesion at the individual level as the measure for dispersion. 32 Column 8 of Table 9 shows that controlling for dispersion hardly a¤ects the estimated relation between social cohesion and the response to team incentives, but does increase its standard error. The within-store dispersion in social cohesion itself does not have a statistically signi…cant relation with the response to team incentive. 33 
Concluding remarks
By combining rich questionnaire data and a large-scale experiment on incentive pay in an actual …rm, we have studied the interplay between team incentives, social cohesion, and team performance. We …nd that team performance increases more after the introduction of team incentives if team members have better social relations. This result is in line with the theoretical prediction that in teams with good social relations, individuals incorporate the external e¤ects of their e¤orts on others and, hence, engage in less free-riding. This result also exempli…es the importance of complementarities in organizations. Firms that introduce or reinforce team incentives would bene…t from enhancing social interactions among employees.
The e¤ect of team incentives on social cohesion within teams turns out to be small. Hence, team incentives do not instantly a¤ect social interactions between colleagues. One caveat here is the relatively short incentive period. Perhaps six weeks is too short to create lasting changes in social relations among employees in real-world workplaces. Whether and how long-lasting changes in incentive pay a¤ect social interactions remains an open question. More generally, given that both …rms and employees value good social relations highly, establishing how management practices a¤ect social cohesion at work is an important area for future research. 32 For 6 stores, we have only one respondent in the pre-experiment questionnaire, implying that the standard deviation cannot be computed. We drop these stores in the reported estimation. Our …ndings are qualitatively similar if, instead, we create a dummy variable for stores with only one respondent. 33 For all robustness checks except the placebo treatment, we …nd that a quadratic speci…cation of the interaction between social cohesion and the introduction of the team incentives yields estimated e¤ects close to those depicted in Figure 7 . The personnel variables are extracted from the company's database as of September 2013. ***, **, * denote statistically significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, between control and treatment stores (t-test). The personnel variables are extracted from the company's database as of September 2013. The survey measures are derived from the pre-experiment survey. All correlations are based on 120 stores, except for peer pressure, which is based on 117 stores. ***, **, * denote statistically significant effects at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors clustered at the store level in parentheses. All interaction variables are mean-centered. ***, **, * denote statistically significant effects at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
All stores Control group Treatment group
Standard errors clustered at the store level in parentheses. Post-quest. is a dummy variable indicating that an observation stems from the post-experiment questionnaire. Social cohesion pre-quest. is social cohesion at the individual level as measured All interaction variables are mean-centered.
Social cohesion excl. managers
Correcting for dispersion in social cohesion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) ***, **, * denote statistically significant effects at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
All interaction variables are mean-centered.
the competition group level.
Cluster at group level Standard errors clustered at the store level in parentheses in all columns except (5) and (6) . In columns (5) and (6), standard errors are clustered at 0.288 ***, **, * denote statistically significant effects at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Standard errors clustered at the store level in parentheses.
Dependent variable: social cohesion <next page>
The following questions revolve around the helpfulness of employees in your store. <answers: 7-point scale, completely agree … completely disagree> -Team members go out of their way to help co-workers with work-related problems.
-Team members voluntarily help new employees settle into the job.
The following questions revolve around the role of the store manager. <answers: 7-point scale, completely agree … completely disagree> -The store manager expects his/her employees to follow instructions precisely.
-The store manager gives employees no room to make decisions on their own.
-The store manager supervises employees very closely.
-The store manager works hard to ease tensions in the team.
-The store manager works to develop close personal relationships with all employees.
-The store manager demonstrates concern for employees.
<next page>
The following question revolves around your satisfaction with your job.
-How satisfied are you with your current job. <answers: 7-point scale, very satisfied …. very dissatisfied> -Did you look for another job outside <company> in the past two months? <answers: yes, no> -How likely is it that you still work at <company> next year? <answers: 7-point scale, very likely …. very unlikely> <next page>
Thank you for your time to participate in this survey.
Your answers have been recorded.
<The survey for store managers was almost identical. In the part on co-worker shirking, we removed the question 'I spoke about it with the store manager'. In the part on the role of the store manager, we replaced 'The store manager' by 'I' in all 6 questions.>
